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Invalidating Gene Patents:
Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office
Ashley McHugh*
Biotechnology companies and research institutions have patented thousands of genes
based on the idea that a gene in an isolated and purified form is a patentable invention.
The biotechnology industry has since grown to a multibillion dollar industry using
gene patents as a basis for targeting new drugs, researching genetic disease, and
developing diagnostics. One company, Myriad Genetics, faces the threat of having their
patents invalidated because of their monopolistic use of their patents on human breast
cancer genes. In Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, the district court found Myriad’s gene patents invalid and unenforceable. If
upheld, the decision will invalidate all patents on human genes and potentially many
other patents on isolated and purified natural products, having far-reaching
implications for health, science, and biotechnology.
This Note questions the district court decision in Association for Molecular Pathology
to grant the plaintiffs standing to sue Myriad and the United States Patent &
Trademark Office and to invalidate gene patents under existing case law. Opponents of
gene patents argue that genes are products of nature and are therefore not patentable
subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act. However, circuit courts have consistently
endorsed the principle that isolated and purified products of nature are still inventions
and patentable subject matter in certain circumstances. Although the patentability of
human genes under § 101 had not been addressed by courts until now, human genes
have been upheld as patentable under other requirements of the Patent Act. Because
invalidating gene patents will not likely remedy the monopolistic effects of gene patents,
this Note reviews several legislative approaches that could serve as a more appropriate
vehicle to address the harms that gene patents cause.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011; B.A., Human
Biology, Stanford University, 2006. I would like to thank my advisor, Jeffrey Lefstin, Professor of Law,
U.C. Hastings College of the Law, for his guidance and support. I would also like to thank the editors
and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their work on this Note.
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Introduction
In May 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit
against Myriad Genetics, Inc. and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), seeking to invalidate Myriad’s patents on
two human genes in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent
1
& Trademark Office. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment, declaring Myriad’s patents invalid and thus essentially
2
invalidating all existing gene patents. The decision reversed longstanding
1. 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
2. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *163 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
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practices of granting and upholding gene patents under USPTO policy
3
and existing case law. The ACLU filed suit on behalf of four scientific
associations, two women’s health groups, eight researchers and genetic
4
counselors, and six breast or ovarian cancer patients.
The plaintiffs sought to invalidate Myriad’s claims related to the
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 (together referred to as BRCA 1/2) genes, whose
mutated forms are associated with an increased risk for breast or ovarian
5
cancer. There were fifteen claims-in-suit from seven patents covering the
non-mutated and mutated isolated and purified forms of the BRCA 1/2
6
genes. The claims also covered methods for detecting a mutation, by
comparing a mutated BRCA 1/2 gene with a non-mutated gene, and for
analyzing the gene sequences to determine whether the gene contains a
7
mutation associated with a higher risk of cancer. The case is unique
because of the nature and identity of the parties, the novelty of the
claims against Myriad and the USPTO, and the impact any decision
would have on the biotechnology industry.
The impact that cancer, and breast cancer in particular, has had on
society gave the case and its outcome particular importance. Myriad’s
monopolistic use of its gene patents has had a detrimental impact on
8
potential and existing cancer patients. Myriad’s exclusive right to the
BRCA genes has also arguably stunted genetic and diagnostic research
9
on the BRCA genes themselves. As patent holder of the isolated and
purified BRCA 1/2 genes, Myriad created diagnostic tests for individuals
to determine their genetic risk for cancer by detecting deleterious
10
mutations in individuals’ BRCA genes. Myriad is the sole provider of
the BRCA diagnostic test, because it is able to prevent other research
institutions from offering BRCA diagnostic testing by enforcing its right
11
to exclude others from using the BRCA genes under its patents. As the
sole provider of BRCA diagnostic testing, Myriad has been able to
arguably exploit patients by charging a high price for the test and to chill
12
research through limited licensing practices. The plaintiffs argued that
the practical effect is that patients and society bear too much of the costs
13
of Myriad’s monopoly.

3. John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Cancer Genes Cannot Be Patented, U.S. Judge Rules, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 30, 2010, at B1.
4. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370–76.
5. Id. at 369.
6. Id. at 380.
7. Id.
8. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *64–70.
9. Id. at *70–81.
10. Id. at *56–57.
11. See id. at *60–64, *73.
12. Id. at *64–81.
13. See id. at *64, *72–73, *76.
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Any decision from the Federal Circuit, and perhaps the Supreme
Court, on appeal will have widespread consequences for the
biotechnology industry. Since the Human Genome Project mapped
nearly 25,000 genes, biotechnology companies have been able to patent
14
thousands of genes: Almost twenty percent of human genes are now
15
patented in the United States. Human genes are useful for a number of
purposes. They provide a basis for targeting new drugs, researching
16
genetic disease, and developing more efficient drugs and diagnostics.
Genomic-based medicine also includes genetic testing, such as Myriad’s
BRCA diagnostic test. Genetic testing can refer to predictive testing of
individuals susceptible to a particular genetic risk associated with a
genetic mutation, diagnostic testing of individuals who have symptoms of
a particular disease, or genetic testing of individuals diagnosed with a
17
particular disease to optimize drug therapy. Because development and
regulatory costs associated with bringing drugs and diagnostics to market
are extremely high, intellectual property rights are needed to encourage
18
investments in biotechnology. Gene patents confer a time-limited
monopoly, providing incentives for companies to invest substantial time
19
and resources in biotechnology and genetics. If the decision is upheld
and companies can no longer patent genes, there will be fewer incentives
for companies to develop genetic technology.
This Note examines the district court decision in Association for
Molecular Pathology under the existing case law surrounding gene
patents. Part I discusses how the courts and administrative patent
agencies have incorporated genes into modern intellectual property
doctrine. Part II explains the current effects that Myriad’s gene patents
have on patients and researchers. Part III analyzes the district court’s
decision to grant the plaintiffs standing and to invalidate gene patents
20
under § 101 of the Patent Act. Part IV examines what impact the district
court decision could have if the Federal Circuit upholds the decision.
Finally, Part V suggests legislative approaches as a more practical
solution than invalidating gene patents under common law.
14. David Koepsell, Who Owns You? The Corporate Gold Rush to Patent Your Genes 3–4
(2009).
15. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310
Science, 239, 239 (2005).
16. Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 835, 837.
17. Id.
18. See Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-on Biologics, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 363, 363–64 (2007).
See generally, Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151 (2003) (surveying ten pharmaceutical firms for sixty-eight randomly
selected new drugs, and finding that the total capitalized costs for new drugs increases at an annual
rate of 7.4%).
19. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 303, 304 (2002).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

McHugh_25 (S. Tosdal) (Do Not Delete)

November 2010]

11/23/2010 5:33 PM

INVALIDATING GENE PATENTS

189

I. The Patentability of Genes Under U.S. Patent Law
A. Patenting DNA
In humans, each cell contains a complete copy of the human
genome in the cell nucleus in the form of chromosomes, which are
21
comprised of long, twisting strands of DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid.
DNA is made of molecules called nucleotides that bind together with a
22
complementary DNA strand creating a double helix. Contiguous
segments of DNA that “code” for the creation of proteins form a single
23
gene. By dictating the function of each cell, DNA affects how a person
24
grows, develops, and reproduces. Genes define physical traits and are
responsible for both the inheritance of those traits and the production of
25
proteins. Each gene contains regions called exons, which code for the
26
creation of proteins to express phenotypes in the human body. A gene
also contains noncoding portions called introns, which are interspersed
27
between the exons. Before the body’s molecular machinery can
synthesize proteins by “reading” the gene, the introns must be spliced
28
out. The processes of reading a gene and synthesizing proteins are
29
called transcription and translation. During transcription, the DNA
double helix splits into a single strand, and an mRNA (messenger
30
ribonucleic acid) is created to complement the single strand of DNA.
RNA is also made of nucleotides, but differs slightly in structure and
31
chemical composition. The introns of the complementary mRNA are
spliced out, and the result is a molecular transcript ready to be “read” to
32
create proteins.
Gene patent holders do not own genes as they exist in a human
body; they own an exclusive right to make, use, sell, or offer to sell a
33
laboratory-synthesized form of the gene. Researchers have been able to

21. Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the Ends Justify the Means?, 7 Computer L. Rev. &
Tech. J. 255, 256 (2003).
22. Lori B. Andrews et al., Genetics: Ethics, Law, and Policy 17 (2002).
23. Id. at 22.
24. John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature
Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part I), 85 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 301, 309
(2003).
25. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *29–30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
26. Andrews et al., supra note 22, at 22.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Conley & Makowski, supra note 24, at 311.
30. Id. at 312.
31. Id. at 311.
32. Id. at 312.
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006); Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5,
2001).
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patent a gene by cloning a DNA strand, or a cDNA, through an artificial
34
process similar to transcription. This process of synthesizing cDNA is
35
referred to as “isolating and purifying” the gene. In laboratories,
researchers create a cDNA by using an enzyme that causes transcription
to occur in reverse, synthesizing a strand of DNA from a mature
36
mRNA. Because mRNA does not contain any introns, neither does the
37
cDNA. The result is a strand of DNA that contains only coding portions
38
of the gene. Thus, the synthesized cDNA differs structurally from
naturally occurring DNA, which contains introns and other molecules.
Though structurally different, cDNA, mRNA, and naturally occurring
DNA all contain the same instructions for the creation of certain
proteins. But scientists and researchers can use cDNA for purposes for
which they cannot use naturally occurring DNA. The use of cDNA “has
revolutionized the fields of molecular biology, biochemistry and
genetics” by allowing researchers to use cDNA to control DNA
expression to study the effect of a gene on a disease or to create proteinbased drugs on a large scale that had been difficult to obtain by
39
purification. In many ways, cDNA is a great deal more useful to
scientists and researchers than native DNA.
B. Novelty, Obviousness, and the Purification Doctrine
The purpose of U.S. patent law is “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts” by granting inventors time-limited exclusive
rights to inventions as an incentive to invest in new research and
40
technology. Patent law must balance this right with the negative effect a
monopoly will have on scientific progress. In order to maintain this
balance, Congress statutorily imposed four major patentability
requirements: patentable subject matter, novelty, usefulness, and
41
nonobviousness.
Patent law generally excludes laws of nature, mental processes, and
abstract ideas from patent protection, reflecting the concern that
granting such protection would hinder scientific progress by expanding

34. Conley & Makowski, supra note 24, at 314.
35. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093.
36. Conley & Makowski, supra note 24, at 314.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Sherry F. Grissom et al., A Qualitative Assessment of Direct-Labeled cDNA Products Prior to
Microarray Analysis, 6 BMC Genomics 36 (2005), http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/14712164-6-36.pdf; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 23 n.6, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ.
4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
40. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2006).
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42

patent monopolies too far. The 1853 Supreme Court case O’Reilly v.
43
Morse exemplifies this fundamental principle. In O’Reilly, the inventor
of the telegraph tried to claim the use of electromagnetism for long44
distance communication. The Court invalidated the claim because
“[t]he mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of nature,
without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a
45
patent.” About a century later, in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., the Court upheld this same principle to invalidate a patent
claiming the mixture of naturally existing bacteria capable of inoculating
46
the seeds of leguminous plants. The Court’s decision to invalidate the
patent was based on the same reasoning as that of O’Reilly:
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or
the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
47
end.

The fundamental principle that natural phenomena, laws of nature, and
abstract ideas are not patentable inventions remains a constant tenet of
48
U.S. patent law. As emerging technological fields such as biotechnology
and genetics arose toward the end of the twentieth century, the line
between phenomena of nature and actual invention began to fade.
Past legal challenges to the validity of gene patents concerned the
49
novelty and nonobviousness requirements for patentability. Prior to the
Patent Act of 1952, courts often confused the requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness, and patentable subject matter and their relation to each
50
other. While novelty and utility were always requirements, the case law

42. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
43. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
44. Id. at 64.
45. Id. at 132.
46. 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
47. Id. at 130.
48. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *111 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
50. See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 360–61 (“The disjunction between historical
precedent in the Supreme Court and CCPA, and the modern practice of most circuit courts in
evaluating biotechnology patents, has created a simmering conflict over the proper interpretation of
sections 101 through 103 in evaluating many biotechnology patent applications. . . . Indeed, the CCPA
even criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Flook, claiming that the Court confused the
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness with the patentable class issue in section 101 . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
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prior to 1952 developed a concept of “invention” later codified as
obviousness, although courts occasionally merged all three concepts
51
under the umbrella of “invention.” Under the current Patent Act of
1952, for an invention to be novel, it must significantly differ from any
52
previous inventions or prior art. An invention is obvious if the invention
as a whole would have been obvious at the time it was created to a
53
person having ordinary skill in the art or relevant field of the invention.
A common argument against granting patents on human gene patents is
that genes are products of nature and are, therefore, an unpatentable
54
discovery. But long before scientists mapped the human genome, the
legal system upheld patents claiming natural products through the
purification doctrine.
The purification doctrine holds that purified products of nature are
novel when they differ significantly from their naturally occurring
55
counterparts. The Supreme Court first addressed a patent claiming a
purified product of nature in 1874, in American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre
56
Disintegrating Co. The Court initially rejected the purification
argument, holding that a patent for purified cellulose to create paper did
not significantly differ in kind or in substance from the naturally
57
occurring cellulose, and it was therefore void for lack of novelty. This
requirement of a significant difference created room for later courts to
uphold patents claiming purified products that had significantly better
58
therapeutic and commercial effects than the impure product. Not all
courts agreed on the validity of this newly founded distinction for
therapeutically valuable purified products. A circuit split arose in the
early twentieth century where the Third Circuit, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA), and the Board of Patent Appeals all
rejected this principle and invalidated patents claiming purified products
59
of nature.

51. See id. at 365.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Philippe G. Ducor, Patenting the Recombinant Products of
Biotechnology and Other Molecules 11 (1998).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
54. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *2.
55. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 332–33.
56. 90 U.S. 566 (1874).
57. Id. at 593–96.
58. See Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 704–05 (7th Cir. 1910)
(upholding the validity of a patent claiming purified acetyl salicylic acid, or “aspirin,” because purified
aspirin had significantly greater therapeutic value than unpurified forms of aspirin); Parke-Davis &
Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding a
patent claiming purified adrenaline did not fail for lack of novelty, because it was more therapeutically
effective than the prior art).
59. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1928) (rejecting a patent
claiming purified tungsten); In re King, 107 F.2d 618, 619 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (rejecting a patent claiming
purified vitamin C); In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (rejecting a patent claiming purified
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After the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, the Fourth Circuit in
Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. upheld the validity of a
patent claiming purified vitamin B-12 because of its therapeutic
60
effectiveness and commercial value. Pointing to an absence of statutory
direction in the 1952 Patent Act, the court noted, “There is nothing in
the language of the Act which precludes the issuance of a patent upon a
‘product of nature’ when it is a ‘new and useful composition of matter’
61
and there is compliance with the specified conditions for patentability.”
The court emphasized the idea that, to a certain extent, all products used
62
to make inventions are from nature. New and useful inventions
63
comprised of matter necessarily include natural products. Under the
Fourth Circuit’s line of reasoning, one cannot draw a line between
64
products of nature and man-made inventions. After the Merck decision,
the Board of Patent Appeals and CCPA reversed themselves, and courts
gradually accepted and upheld patents claiming purified natural
65
products.
C. Modern Acceptance of Gene Patents
In the past, gene patents were granted and upheld under the
purification doctrine, and no one had challenged them as nonpatentable
subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act until Association for
Molecular Pathology. Patentable subject matter under § 101 includes
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
66
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Much of the past
debate around the validity of gene patents had focused on the other
requirements for patentability, especially novelty and nonobviousness, in
67
the context of genes being naturally occurring products. The closest the
Supreme Court has come to a decision about patentable subject matter
under § 101 relating to gene patents was in 1980, when the Court ruled
on the patentability of a genetically engineered living organism in
68
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.

ultramarine dye); In re Ridgway, 76 F.2d 602, 603 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (rejecting a patent claiming the
abrasive chemical, crystalline alpha alumina); Ex parte Reed, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34, 36 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1961), rev’d on reconsideration, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 105 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1961).
60. 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958).
61. Id. at 161.
62. Id. at 162.
63. Id.
64. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 353.
65. Id. at 356. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Ex parte Reed, 135
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 36.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
67. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,
927 F.2d 1200, 1205–09 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
68. 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
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In Chakrabarty, the Patent Office rejected Chakrabarty’s
application for a patent claiming a genetically engineered bacterium
because the definition of patentable under § 101 was not intended to
69
cover living organisms. The Court held that the bacterium was
patentable subject matter as a “manufacture” or “composition of matter”
because it exhibited characteristics that did not exist in the original
70
bacterium, even though the bacterium itself existed naturally. The
Court distinguished the genetically engineered bacterium from Funk
Bros., because there, the mixture of bacteria’s “use in combination does
71
not improve in any way their natural functioning.” But in Chakrabarty,
the bacterium had “markedly different characteristics from any found in
72
nature and one having the potential for significant utility.” Chakrabarty
confirmed that inventors can patent products of nature, but they must
have markedly different characteristics from their naturally occurring
counterparts. Since then, however, the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the purification doctrine in light of the “markedly different
characteristics” requirement delineated in Chakrabarty.
In 1991, the Federal Circuit addressed the patentability of purified
73
DNA in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. In Amgen, Amgen
owned a patent covering isolated and purified DNA sequences coding
74
for the production of human erythropoietin (EPO). This protein
stimulates the production of red blood cells and is used in the treatment
75
of anemias or other blood disorders. Amgen sued Chugai and Genetics
Institute for direct infringement by producing recombinant human EPO
76
through DNA technology. Chugai raised several affirmative defenses,
77
including the invalidity of Amgen’s patent for lack of novelty. While the
court was careful to note that “neither [party] invented EPO or the EPO
gene,” it emphasized that “[t]he subject matter of [one of Amgen’s
patent claims] was the novel purified and isolated sequence which codes
78
for EPO . . . .” The Federal Circuit upheld the validity of Amgen’s
patent claims on the DNA sequences, because the gene was isolated and
79
purified and, therefore, novel. Since Amgen, courts have generally
80
upheld isolated and purified genes as novel and nonobvious.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 308–09, 318.
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1203–04
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1206, 1219.
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 408.
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II. Myriad’s BRCA Patents and Their Effect
Prior USPTO policy of granting gene patents allowed Myriad to
obtain patents claiming two important genes associated with breast and
ovarian cancer: BRCA 1 and BRCA 2. Everyone carries the BRCA 1/2
genes; however, individuals with a mutated BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 gene
81
may have an increased risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.
Depending on the type of mutation and family history, individuals
carrying a BRCA mutation have a forty to eighty-five percent chance of
developing breast cancer and a sixteen to forty percent chance of
82
developing ovarian cancer during their lifetimes. Roughly five to ten
percent of women with breast and ovarian cancer are likely to have
83
inherited a mutated BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 gene. Given the large role the
BRCA genes can play in breast and ovarian cancer, Myriad’s patents are
extremely important and valuable intellectual property.
A. The History and Importance of BRCA
Many parties recognized the value and importance of the BRCA 1/2
genes almost immediately after they were discovered. In 1990, a team led
by Mary-Claire King, a human geneticist on faculty at the University of
California, Berkeley, recognized that a mutated form of BRCA 1
84
increased the risk of developing breast cancer. Mark Skolnick, cofounder of Myriad, sequenced BRCA 1 with help from researchers at
Myriad and the University of Utah, the U.S. National Institutes of
85
Health (NIH), and McGill University. Shortly thereafter, it became
apparent that another gene, BRCA 2, was also linked with increased risk
86
of breast and ovarian cancer. Skolnick raced against a group of U.K.
87
researchers to discover, sequence, and patent BRCA 2. Myriad filed for
a patent claiming BRCA 2 in the U.S. while CRC Technology, a U.K.
88
research institution, filed for a patent in the U.K. Around that same
time, the National Institute of Health (NIH), Myriad, and another gene
discovery company, OncorMed, Inc., all filed overlapping patents

81. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U. S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
82. Id. (breast cancer); Abram Katz, Breast Cancer Gene Test Disputed, New Haven Reg., Sept.
30, 2007, http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2007/09/30/import/18868796.prt (ovarian cancer).
83. Id.
84. Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of
Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 Health L.J. 123, 131 (2002).
85. Id. In 1991, Mark Skolnick, Adjunct Professor in the Department of Medical Informatics at
the University of Utah, co-founded Myriad with Walter Gilbert, 1980 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry
and Professor in the Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology at Harvard University, and Peter
Meldrum, past President and CEO of a company called Agridyne. Id. at 129.
86. Id. at 132.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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89

claiming BRCA 1. The NIH withdrew its patent application once two of
their researchers were named on Myriad’s BRCA 1 patent, and Myriad
eventually purchased an exclusive license to OncorMed’s patents in a
90
lawsuit settlement. By the end of the race, Myriad owned patent rights
91
to both the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genes in the U.S.
Before 1996, Myriad had not yet asserted its exclusivity rights over
the BRCA 1/2 genes. Other research institutions offered cheaper BRCA
92
diagnostic testing. Some researchers were even given the test free of
93
charge. These tests varied in methodology, the part of the gene being
94
tested, and who could be tested based on population. In the late 1990s,
Myriad offered various researchers a limited license agreement to
95
perform the test only on patients of Ashkenazi Jewish descent. Because
Myriad owned patents on the mutated and non-mutated BRCA genes, it
was able to require all researchers to pay a royalty fee under a license
agreement in order to conduct genetic tests, regardless of differences
96
methodologies. The researchers declined the offer because it was too
97
narrow a license to perform any meaningful BRCA 1/2 testing. Myriad
subsequently issued cease-and-desist letters to the research institutions
that were providing unlicensed genetic BRCA testing to female
98
patients. The researchers could not continue to use their own separate
99
diagnostic tests or to create new, improved diagnostic tests.
Myriad now owns patents claiming all forms of the isolated BRCA
1/2 genes themselves, any mutations thereof, all methods comparing or
analyzing the two BRCA sequences to see if a mutation exists or to
screen for potential cancer therapeutics, and several other related
100
claims. Myriad currently provides two genetic diagnostic tests to detect

89. Id.
90. Id. at 132–33.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 135.
93. Id. at 134–35.
94. Id.
95. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *61–62 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
96. See id. at *61–63.
97. Id. at *62.
98. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378–
79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
99. There is a common law research exception to patent infringement, but the defense is “very
narrow and limited to actions performed ‘for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry.’ Further, use does not qualify for the experimental use defense when it is
undertaken in the ‘guise of scientific inquiry’ but has ‘definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
commercial purposes.’” Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)
(quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The exception
would not apply to researchers who are working to develop diagnostic tests for BRCA, because any
test created would have commercial value.
100. Complaint at 20–24, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
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the presence or absence of mutations in the BRCA 1/2 genes. The first
test, the Comprehensive BRACAnalysis Test costs more than $3000 per
101
test. The second test, the BRACAnalysis Rearrangement Test, searches
for large genetic mutations not caught by the standard Comprehensive
102
BRACAnalysis Test. The BRACAnalysis Rearrangement Test costs
approximately $650, but Myriad conducts the test for women who meet
103
certain criteria at no additional cost.
B. The Negative Effects of Myriad’s Patents
Myriad’s patents have had a number of negative effects on both
patients and on the scientific community. As the sole provider of full
sequencing of the BRCA 1/2 genes, Myriad is able to charge over $3000
104
per test. For some women, such as several of the plaintiffs, Myriad will
not accept their insurance, so they need to pay the full amount to find
105
out whether they have a genetic predisposition to cancer. Despite
oncologists’ and genetic counselors’ recommendations, these women
106
cannot be tested if they cannot afford the full price of the test. In
addition, due to the nature of patenting a gene itself, there is no available
107
workaround for researchers to develop improved diagnostic tests. This
is because a genetic diagnostic test requires the exact patented gene
segment, such as BRCA 1. There is no substitute for that gene, so “the
[inability] to use the patent-protected gene would, by definition, result in
an incomplete and clinically unacceptable test since all of those
individuals with the disease who have a mutation in the patented gene
108
would go undetected and undiagnosed.” Thus, researchers cannot even
develop independent, alternative ways of testing for BRCA mutations.
Alternative tests would help patients and researchers in many ways.
They would spur competition, which would improve the quality of the
tests and lower costs of diagnostic testing. Alternative tests also would
allow patients diagnosed with a cancer-predisposing mutation to receive
confirmatory testing before making major medical decisions about
109
invasive preventative treatment, such as a mastectomy or oophorectomy.

101. Id. at 27.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 28.
104. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *57 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
105. Id. at *14–16.
106. Id.
107. Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Genetics, Health, & Soc’y, Gene Patents and Licensing
Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests 15 (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS
Report] (“Inventing around a technology involves making an invention that accomplishes the same
thing as the original patented invention but that does not infringe the patented invention.”).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 44.
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Confirmatory testing by alternative tests would control for false
negatives generated from Myriad’s BRACAnalysis. While there are a
few laboratories that conduct confirmatory BRCA 1/2 testing pursuant
to patent license agreements with Myriad, testing “is limited to the
confirmation of certain, specific positive test results; the remaining types
of positive test results as well as all negative test results are excluded
110
from such testing services.” A 2006 study in the Journal of the
American Medical Association revealed that twelve percent of the
participants from families with high risk breast cancer received negative
results from Myriad’s test, but actually carried cancer-predisposing
111
mutations in one of their genes tested. Those who receive a falsely
negative result from Myriad’s test are led to believe they are not
genetically at risk for breast cancer and would have little reason to
pursue any preventative measures. Moreover, Myriad’s tests do not look
for all known mutations correlated with breast and ovarian cancer, but
because of its patent claiming the isolated BRCA sequences themselves,
Myriad is able to bar other researchers from developing diagnostic tests
112
that could identify further such mutations. As a result, Myriad’s BRCA
patents have had a detrimental impact on patients and researchers by
barring the development of alternative diagnostic tests for BRCA
mutations.
C. The Lawsuit Against Myriad
The plaintiffs in the suit against Myriad sought a declaratory
judgment that Myriad’s patent claims were invalid and/or unenforceable,
and an injunction against defendants from taking actions to enforce the
113
patents. The complaint challenged the validity of Myriad’s patents
claiming the isolated mutated and non-mutated forms of BRCA 1 and
BRCA 2, the method of analyzing an individual’s BRCA 1 gene to
determine if an inherited mutation exists, and the method of comparing
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 sequences containing mutations with normal
sequences to determine whether the difference indicates a predisposition
114
to breast or ovarian cancer. The plaintiffs challenged Myriad’s patent
claims as nonpatentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act and
as unconstitutional under Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the United
115
States Constitution, as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

110. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *69.
111. See Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in
Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 JAMA 1379, 1386 (2006).
112. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
113. Complaint at 30, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
114. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 380.
115. Id. at 369–70.
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On March 29, 2010, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment and invalidated Myriad’s BRCA and related method
patents under § 101 as nonpatentable subject matter, finding that the
patented genes do not markedly differ from genes as they exist in
116
The court dismissed the constitutional claims under the
nature.
117
doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
Since the inception of recombinant DNA technology, thousands of
118
isolated and purified genes have been patented. This decision, if
upheld, will have a tremendous impact on the biotechnology sector by
invalidating all existing gene patents and, potentially, other related or
similar patents.

III. Invalidating Gene Patents
While the case is “unique in the identity of the parties, the scope
and significance of the issues presented, and the consequences of the
remedy sought,” the decision to invalidate Myriad’s BRCA patents
119
In applying the “markedly different
should not be upheld.

116. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *145, *163 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
117. Id. at *161–62 (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)) (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court also granted the
USPTO’s motion to dismiss for judgment on the pleadings because the only claims against the USPTO
were constitutional claims. Id. at *163.
118. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 19, at 359.
119. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370. This Note will address the district court
opinion invalidating the gene patents alone and will not address the decision to invalidate Myriad’s
method patents. The district court invalidated Myriad’s method patents in light of the Federal Circuit’s
decisions in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2009), and In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010). The Federal Circuit in Bilski articulated the “machine or transformation” test for patentability
under § 101 for method patents. 545 F.3d at 954. According to the Federal Circuit decision in Bilski, a
method is patentable under § 101 “if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” Id. Prometheus involved the validity of
patent claims for methods determining the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs by measuring metabolite
levels in patients’ blood. 581 F.3d at 1339. In Prometheus, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed
methods satisfied the “machine or transformation” test, because determining metabolite levels
included the extraction of metabolites by using some form of manipulation, which was a
transformative step central to the claimed method. Id. at 1347. The district court distinguished
Prometheus in Association for Molecular Pathology, holding that Myriad’s methods of analyzing or
comparing BRCA sequences to determine a genetic mutation were invalid because the methods of
“comparing” and “analyzing” were directed only toward the abstract mental processes of comparing
and analyzing gene sequences, which is not transformative in nature. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at
*151–53. However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Bilski stated that the Federal Circuit’s
“machine or transformation” test is not the exclusive test for defining processes under § 101. 130 S. Ct.
at 3226. This important distinction may affect whether the district court decision to invalidate Myriad’s
diagnostic method patents is upheld.
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characteristics” test from Chakrabarty, the district court did not
adequately reconcile invalidating the BRCA patents as nonpatentable
subject matter under § 101 with the prior case law establishing and
upholding the purification doctrine. Even if the district court decision to
invalidate gene patents under § 101 is upheld, all the plaintiffs except
those who actually received cease-and-desist letters lacked standing to
sue Myriad. While the negative impact of gene patents on patients and
the scientific community is real and important, the court should not relax
the standing requirements to remedy the negative effects of Myriad’s
patents.
A. Constitutional Standing to Sue the USPTO
Even though the district court resolved the plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims in favor of the USPTO, that does not render moot the standing
issue: none of the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against the
USPTO in the first place. Under Article III, there must be a justiciable
case or controversy for a plaintiff to have standing for the court to hear
120
To have standing, a plaintiff must satisfy the
his or her case.
constitutional requirement by showing (1) actual or threatened injury as
a result of the defendant’s actions, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to
the defendant’s actions, and (3) that the plaintiff’s injury can be
121
redressed by a favorable decision. In addition, the plaintiff must satisfy
the prudential requirement by asserting his or her own legal interest,
122
rather than a generalized grievance shared by a larger class.
The court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the constitutional
requirement by showing that their injury resulted from the USPTO’s
123
policy to grant patents claiming DNA. If it were not for the USPTO
allowing Myriad to monopolize the BRCA 1/2 genes, researchers could
provide BRCA diagnostic testing, and the patients would not be
deprived of adequate and cost effective diagnostic tests. In addition,
plaintiffs’ injuries could be remedied by a favorable decision from the
court. Invalidating the patents would allow researchers to be free to
research the gene, and other companies could provide diagnostic testing,
which would lower the cost of being tested for patients. Therefore, the
plaintiffs satisfied the constitutional requirement for standing.
The plaintiffs, however, did not satisfy the prudential requirement,
because their injuries constitute a generalized grievance shared by a large

120. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
121. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982).
122. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975).
123. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
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124

class of citizens. Every person has a BRCA gene, and the cost and
availability of Myriad’s tests affects any person who wants to be tested.
In addition, Myriad’s patents prevent anyone from conducting research
on the BRCA genes, or from providing BRCA diagnostic testing. In
support of this contention, the defendants cited Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Quigg, which involved a challenge to the issuance of a notice by
the Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks that non-naturally occurring
125
substances such as animals could be patented. The plaintiffs in that case
claimed that the Commissioner violated the Administrative Procedure
126
Act (APA) by failing to comply with the requirements of the APA’s
127
public notice provision. They also claimed he acted in excess of
128
statutory authority under the Patent Act. The Federal Circuit dismissed
the claim for lack of standing, because the plaintiffs asserted “no adverse
effect on any individual’s rights to benefits under the patent statute.
Rather, they assert[ed] that the general public has an interest in the
129
Similarly, the plaintiffs in
statutory limitations to patentability.”
Association for Molecular Pathology asserted an interest shared by a
larger class, as well as the entire scientific, research, and medical
130
communities. Their shared interest was in remedying the monopolistic
effect of Myriad’s patents by limiting research and medicine. Technically,
any consumer, patient, or researcher who would like to test or be tested
for a BRCA mutation would have the same interest.
Although the district court distinguished Animal Legal Defense
Fund, it failed to recognize the plaintiffs’ interests as widely shared. The
court distinguished Animal Legal Defense Fund because the decision
turned on a lack of a legally cognizable right under the specific provisions
131
of the APA. Additionally, the claimed harm in Animal Legal Defense
Fund was merely speculative, because a patent claiming an animal had
132
not actually been granted. In contrast, the court stated that because
Myriad actually owns existing patents claiming the BRCA 1/2 genes
granted by the USPTO, the plaintiffs’ harm is not speculative as Myriad

124. Id. at 378.
125. Id. at 392 & n.20 (citing Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
126. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–06 (2006).
127. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 932 F.2d at 925–26.
128. Id. at 931.
129. Id. at 929.
130. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *7–16. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
131. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.11; see Animal Legal Def. Fund, 932
F.2d at 931 (“Having reviewed all of appellants’ arguments, we are persuaded that the Commissioner’s
Notice falls within the ‘interpretative’ exception to the section 553 public notice and comment procedures.
Appellants thus have no standing to assert Count I of the Complaint by reason of ‘procedural
harm.’”).
132. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384 n.11.
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actively prevents breast cancer patients from obtaining diagnostic tests.
However, even if the plaintiffs’ harms are substantiated, their harms are
still a generalized grievance shared by a larger class. Dicta in Animal
Legal Defense Fund supported the decision to dismiss for lack of
standing, even if an animal patent had been granted, giving rise to a
cognizable harm:
Moreover, we find nothing in the law which gives rise to a right in
nonapplicants to object to the way in which patent applications of
others are prosecuted. A third party has no right to intervene in the
prosecution of a particular patent application to prevent issuance of an
134
allegedly invalid patent.

The district court in Association for Molecular Pathology justified
the plaintiffs’ standing even though their harms were generalized
grievances, based on the fact that the plaintiffs asserted constitutionality
135
claims against Myriad’s patents. Nevertheless, asserting the harm as a
constitutional violation should not counteract the prudential requirement
for standing. The prudential standing requirement is a separate
requirement in addition to that of a legally cognizable harm under
136
constitutional standing doctrine. While the plaintiffs have experienced
actual harm, the harm is still a generalized grievance shared by all
researchers and patients in the scientific community who are interested
in engaging in clinical analysis of the BRCA genes.
Not only did the plaintiffs fail to meet the prudential requirement,
existing legislation precludes standing by outlining a specific procedure
for third parties to challenge the validity of a patent. In the context of
standing, the Supreme Court has held that “when a statute provides a
detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the
behest of particular persons, judicial review of those issues at the behest
137
of other persons may be found to be impliedly precluded.” Congress
has already outlined a statutory procedure for third parties to challenge a
patent issued by the USPTO in reexamination proceedings, and the
statute does not specifically allow for a private cause of action for third
138
parties. Once a patent is granted, the Patent Act allows for any third
party, at any time, to request a reexamination of the patent from the
133. Id.
134. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 932 F.2d at 930 (citing Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc. v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The creation of a right or remedy in a
third party to challenge a result favorable to a patent owner after ex parte prosecution would be
unprecedented, and we conclude that such a right cannot be inferred.”); Chi. Rawhide Mfg. Co. v.
Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452, 458 n.13 (7th Cir. 1975); Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 121 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1941), aff’d, 316 U.S. 364 (1942); Godtfredsen v. Banner, 503 F.
Supp. 642, 646 (D.D.C. 1980).
135. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384–85.
136. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985).
137. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984).
138. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314–15 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2007).
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USPTO, but “[t]he active participation of the ex parte reexamination
requester ends with the reply . . . , and no further submissions on behalf
139
of the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or considered.”
After reexamination proceedings, the third party requesters cannot seek
judicial review because the Patent Act specifies that only patent
140
applicants may do so. Thus, under existing legislation, request for
reexamination is the only way a third party may challenge the validity of
a patent after the USPTO grants the patent. Challenges by third parties
to the validity of a patent are limited to a reexamination request or as a
defense to an allegation of infringement.
In Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, the
Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holding that a statute
outlining a detailed mechanism for review of an issue can preclude
141
judicial review of that issue. The Federal Circuit dismissed a suit
brought against the USPTO to compel the USPTO to reopen the
reexamination for lack of standing, because Congress precluded judicial
review of reexamination decisions by creating a “comprehensive
142
statutory scheme” for reexamination. The court concluded that “a
plaintiff cannot claim standing based on violation of an asserted personal
statutorily-created procedural right when Congress intended to grant
143
that plaintiff no such right.” The district court in Association for
Molecular Pathology distinguished this case, because the plaintiffs could
not file reexamination requests for the alleged constitutional violations,
144
so “the Patent Act provide[d] no remedy” for them. The plaintiffs did
not file a reexamination request because reexamination is limited to
145
claims of invalidity based on prior art. Instead, the plaintiffs asserted
146
unique claims based on constitutionality. Therefore, according to the
court, the only avenue available to remedy their constitutional harms is
by lawsuit. However, the holding in Syntex could be extended to the
current case because Congress specifically outlined a reexamination
framework for claims of invalidity based on the prior art. Congress could
have allowed for reexamination by any third party for any reason, but
declined to do so. Thus, it is possible that Congress wanted to avoid
waves of reexamination proceedings and lawsuits brought by third
parties against lawfully granted patents under USPTO policies. Outlining

139. 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 314–15.
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 305; Boeing Co. v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 853 F.2d 878, 881 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
141. 882 F.2d 1570, 1573–74 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
142. Id. at 1573.
143. Id. (quoting Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167, 1170 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
144. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 384–
85 (S.D.N.Y 2009).
145. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 311.
146. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
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reexamination procedures for novelty and obviousness claims only could
impliedly preclude third party standing to sue to invalidate a patent that
has already been reviewed and approved by the USPTO.
Finally, the precedential effects of allowing the plaintiffs to sue the
USPTO as third parties seeking to invalidate a patent are an important
consideration. Allowing the plaintiffs to file suit for allegedly
unconstitutional policies potentially invites the feared and admonished
“flood of litigants” to challenge USPTO decisions based on
constitutional claims, rather than following the reexamination
procedures outlined in the Patent Act. Setting this precedent would also
encourage third parties who are unsuccessful in invalidating a patent
through reexamination, and consequently precluded from obtaining
judicial review, to then file suit claiming constitutional violations. Patents
already undergo initial review and approval by the USPTO and are
147
presumed valid. Allowing any third party to sue for a legally granted
patent seriously undermines the purpose of the USPTO.
B. Declaratory Judgment Standing to Sue Myriad and the
University of Utah Research Foundation
To sue for a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must satisfy the
Supreme Court’s “all circumstances” test. Generally, suits for declaratory
judgment relating to patents are filed by potential infringers in
148
anticipation of an infringement action. Potential infringers usually seek
a declaratory judgment from the court stating that they do not infringe
the patent or that the patent is invalid before the inventor can sue them
149
for infringement. However, Association for Molecular Pathology was a
unique action, where third party patients, referred to as non-researcher
plaintiffs in the district court opinion, and researchers sought to
150
invalidate the patent, rather than potential infringers. In applying the
existing declaratory judgment requirements for standing, the district
court should not have granted standing for the non-researcher plaintiffs.
The appropriate standard to determine whether a court may hear a
declaratory judgment action is the “all circumstances” test from
151
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. Under this test, the court must
determine whether, under all the circumstances, “there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory

147. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
148. Jennifer Saionz, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: The Federal Circuit's
Response to MedImmune v. Genentech, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 161, 165 (2008).
149. Id.
150. 669 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
151. 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
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152

judgment.” Plaintiffs must demonstrate there was an actual controversy
by showing (1) there were affirmative acts by the defendant to enforce
the patent, and (2) that the plaintiffs had engaged in meaningful
153
preparation to conduct the infringing activity.
The court in this case should not have granted the non-researcher
plaintiffs standing to sue Myriad and the University of Utah Research
154
Foundation. Myriad sent cease-and-desist letters to various researchers
and organizations who were researching the BRCA 1/2 genes and/or
155
were providing commercial diagnostic tests. Sending the letters was a
sufficient affirmative act to enforce the patent in satisfaction of the first
prong. In satisfaction of the second prong, all the plaintiffs stated they
were “ready, willing, and able” to conduct infringing activity consisting of
156
clinical research and practices using BRCA 1/2 genes. The plaintiffs
can be divided into two groups: researcher plaintiffs and non-researcher
plaintiffs. The researcher plaintiffs, consisting of researchers and science
organizations ready to use BRCA 1/2 for diagnostic testing and research
activities, satisfied the declaratory judgment standing requirements,
because they could provide alternative testing services other than
Myriad’s diagnostic tests to potential breast cancer patients. The district
court erroneously held that the non-researcher plaintiffs (the breast
cancer plaintiffs and women’s health groups) had standing because they
were ready, able, and willing to use the diagnostic testing services that
157
the researcher plaintiffs would offer. Although they do not have the
potential to directly infringe Myriad’s patents, because they themselves
would not be using the isolated and purified BRCA genes, the district
court found them to be “potential contributory infringers,” because they
158
were ready, able, and willing be tested by the researcher plaintiffs.
In the past, courts have held that potential indirect infringers had
standing for a declaratory judgment without a showing of direct

152. Id. (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
153. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87.
154. Id. at 392.
155. Id. at 387 n.13, 390; see Complaint at 19, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365
(No. 09 Civ. 4515).
156. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 371; Complaint at 3–13, Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
157. Complaint at 10–13, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (No. 09 Civ. 4515);
see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 391–92.
158. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 392; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006)
(“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).
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infringement, but only where the patentee directly notified the indirect
159
infringer about enforcing its patents against the indirect infringer.
Indirect infringement can include induced infringement or contributory
160
infringement. Both actions involve somehow aiding or causing another
person to directly infringe the patent, but a person cannot be liable for
161
indirect infringement without the occurrence of direct infringement. In
Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., the Federal Circuit held that a
manufacturer of a product used in drilling mud had standing to bring a
declaratory judgment action against the assignees of drilling mud
162
patents. The plaintiff, Fina Research (FRSA), could only be liable for
indirect infringement, because its product could only satisfy one element
163
of the multi-element patent claims. Baroid tried to argue that FRSA
did not have standing, because direct infringement had not actually
occurred; thus, FRSA could not have meaningfully prepared to infringe
164
under the second prong of the test for declaratory judgment standing.
The Federal Circuit rejected Baroid’s contention, holding that a potential
indirect infringer could bring an action for declaratory judgment even if
165
no direct infringement had occurred. Similarly, the researcher plaintiffs
in Association for Molecular Pathology were not required to have
directly infringed Myriad’s BRCA patents in order to have standing to
bring a declaratory judgment action.
While Fina Research establishes that indirect infringers can have
declaratory judgment standing, Fina Research is easily distinguishable
from Association for Molecular Pathology. In Fina Research, the Federal
Circuit recognized the difficulties in determining whether an actual
166
controversy emanates from potential indirect infringement. The court
confirmed, “whether a declaratory plaintiff’s ability and definite
intention to undertake a potentially infringing activity constitutes

159. See Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1485–86 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 356 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1966); Unif. Prod. Code Council, Inc. v.
Kaslow, 460 F. Supp. 900, 903–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Recently, the Supreme Court in MedImmune,
abandoned the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension” test to sue for declaratory judgment,
which the Federal Circuit applied in Fina Research, as too stringent. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). This decision renders all Federal Circuit opinions decided under the
“reasonable apprehension” test questionable, but Fina Research, although decided under the
“reasonable apprehension” test, is still dispositive of the holding that indirect infringers can have
standing to sue for declaratory judgment. If the indirect infringers in Fina Research satisfied the
Federal Circuit’s more stringent test, they would likely satisfy the more relaxed “all circumstances”
test under MedImmune.
160. See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
161. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
162. 141 F.3d at 1481–82, 1485–86.
163. Id. at 1481–82.
164. Id. at 1485.
165. Id. at 1485–86.
166. Id. at 1485.

McHugh_25 (S. Tosdal) (Do Not Delete)

November 2010]

INVALIDATING GENE PATENTS

11/23/2010 5:33 PM

207

sufficient ‘preparation’ is a question of degree to be resolved on a case167
by-case basis.” Although the non-researcher plaintiffs in Association
for Molecular Pathology did not need to show direct infringement, the
relationship between non-researcher plaintiffs and Myriad is less
pronounced than the relationship between the parties in Fina Research.
One major factor exemplifying this discrepancy is the nature of the
patentee’s affirmative acts to enforce the patent in Fina Research. Baroid
sent a letter directly to FRSA notifying the plaintiffs that introducing its
product into U.S. markets would induce infringement, and that it
168
intended to enforce its patents. Baroid directly notified FRSA that it
could enforce its patents, putting the indirect infringers on notice of a
potential infringement action to allow them to bring a suit for
169
declaratory judgment. In the current case, Myriad’s actions to enforce
its patents were only directed at specific researcher plaintiffs, and not in
170
any way directed toward the non-researcher plaintiffs. The nonresearcher plaintiffs might not have even known of Myriad’s efforts to
enforce its patents until litigation had been initiated. Therefore, without
any notice from the patentee, the non-researcher plaintiffs had no reason
to bring a declaratory judgment and should not have had standing.
The Supreme Court decision in MedImmune could provide some
support for the plaintiffs, but not enough. In MedImmune, the Supreme
Court abandoned the Federal Circuit’s stringent standing requirement
that the declaratory plaintiff have “reasonable apprehension” that he or
171
she will face an infringement suit. Now, instead of the “reasonable
apprehension of suit” test, courts only need to employ the less stringent
172
“all circumstances” test. However, it is unclear whether the standard
has been so relaxed that the declaratory party need not have known of
the patentee’s efforts to enforce its patents at all. If the patentee has not
made any effort to enforce its patent against a declaratory party, there
seems to be no indication that the parties actually have adverse legal
interests, or that there is sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment. Allowing the non-researcher
plaintiffs to bring an action for declaratory judgment, in essence, allows
any person “able and willing” to use the product of a potential infringer
to sue a patentee at any time, so long as there is at least one instance
where the patentee has attempted to enforce its patent rights against any

167. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.,
846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
168. Id. at 1482.
169. Id.
170. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370–
73 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
171. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127, 132 n.11 (2007).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53.
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potential infringer. This expands the doctrine of standing for declaratory
judgment far beyond its scope. The only parties who should have
standing to bring a declaratory judgment action against Myriad for
patent invalidity are those research institutions who received cease-anddesist letters, or any direct action from Myriad enforcing its patent rights.
Even though the researcher plaintiffs who received cease-and-desist
letters from Myriad likely had standing to bring a declaratory judgment,
the district court erred in finding that genes are not patentable subject
matter.
C. Gene Patents Under § 101
The district court made two errors in invalidating Myriad’s gene
patents for lack of § 101 patentable subject matter. First, the court
misapplied Chakrabarty’s “markedly different characteristics” test by
ignoring the therapeutic and commercial properties of purified DNA
that distinguish it from native DNA. Second, the district court
misconstrued the chemical nature of purified DNA to conclude that it
does not significantly differ from native DNA. These errors are
inconsistent with prior Federal Circuit decisions upholding the
patentability of isolated and purified compounds.
1. Therapeutic and Commercial Value and the “Markedly Different
Characteristics” Test
The district court misapplied the “markedly different
characteristics” test from Chakrabarty to conclude that isolated and
purified genes do not significantly differ from native DNA. For the § 101
requirement, the proper analysis is to determine “(1) whether the
claimed invention possesses utility; and (2) whether the claimed
invention constitutes statutory subject matter, that is, whether it is a
‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
173
and useful improvement thereof.’” Under Chakrabarty, patentable
subject matter includes products of nature, as long as the new product
has “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one
174
having the potential for significant utility.”
The district court relied heavily on the 1931 Supreme Court case,
American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., which involved a patent claim
on fresh citrus fruit whose skin has been treated with the mineral
175
solution, borax, to prevent molding. The Court rejected the patent and
stated:

173. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *107 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
174. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
175. 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931).
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Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from
the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive
form, quality, or property. . . . There is no change in the name,
appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange
176
fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.

Similarly, the district court in Association for Molecular Pathology
emphasized “the overriding importance of DNA’s nucleotide sequence
to both its natural biological function as well as the utility associated with
DNA in its isolated form,” finding that there was not a significant
177
difference between the natural and isolated DNA. Isolated and
purified DNA and natural DNA still serve the same function: coding for
proteins. Like the orange in American Fruit Growers, the isolated and
purified DNA is functionally the same as native DNA, because the two
products code for the same proteins.
Myriad relied on Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Parke-Davis &
178
Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co. to show that isolated and purified DNA was
similar to other isolated chemicals that were found to be patent179
eligible. In Parke-Davis, the court considered the validity of a patent
claiming purified adrenaline, a natural hormone found in animal
180
glands. The prior art, powdered suprarenal glands, contained some
desired therapeutic properties, but could not be safely administered in
181
humans. Nevertheless, the court found that the purified adrenaline was
novel because it could be administered to humans for therapeutic
182
purposes.
The district court in Association for Molecular Pathology
distinguished Parke-Davis on the grounds that the plaintiffs challenged
Parke-Davis’s patent claiming the purified adrenaline for lack of novelty
183
and not for lack of patentable subject matter. The district court cited
subsequent cases establishing that novelty and obviousness
considerations should not be taken into account in determining
patentable subject matter, because they are “separate requirements,”
and that the test for patentable subject matter is whether the invention
contains “‘markedly different characteristics’ over products existing in
184
nature.” While novelty and patentable subject matter now are separate

176. Id. at 11–12.
177. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *134–35.
178. 189 F. 95, 109 (S.D.N.Y 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
179. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *121–23 (citing Parke-Davis,
189 F. at 97).
180. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 97.
181. Id. at 106.
182. See id. at 102.
183. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *123–24.
184. Id. at *125 (quoting Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343
(2009); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)); see also id. at *107 (“The Supreme Court
subsequently affirmed this understanding of the § 101 analysis in Diehr, noting that while it had been
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requirements, courts did not distinguish between the requirements
before 1952, which created inconsistent qualifications for the novelty and
185
patentable subject matter requirements. Following the district court’s
reasoning to its logical end, commercial and therapeutic properties are
sufficient to satisfy the novelty requirement under Parke-Davis but are
not markedly different characteristics sufficient to satisfy the patentable
subject matter requirement. The court stated that this approach was
consistent with the Supreme Court’s rejection of patents claiming
commercially useful natural products in American Fruit Growers, Funk
Bros., American Wood-Paper, and O’Reilly for lack of patentable subject
186
matter. However, the court failed to address a major distinction
between cases upholding patents claiming purified products of nature,
such as Parke-Davis and Merck, and cases rejecting patents claiming
purified products of nature, such as Funk Bros., American Fruit Growers,
and O’Reilly. The products in the former set of cases differed from their
natural counterparts in therapeutic value, while the products in the latter
cases did not.
While commercial value alone may be insufficient to constitute a
markedly different characteristic, it is a relevant consideration. The
circuit courts have held that when a product’s purification gives it
significant commercial and therapeutic value, the purified product is
187
patentable subject matter. Merck, decided after the enactment of the
Patent Act of 1952, applied Judge Hand’s reasoning in Parke-Davis to
188
patentable subject matter under § 101. The court upheld a patent
claiming purified vitamin B-12 as patentable subject matter because of its
189
increased therapeutic value. The court stated that a § 101 inquiry
should be considered in two steps:
(1) that a patent may not be granted upon an old product though it be
derived from a new source by a new and patentable process, and
(2) that every step in the purification of a product is not a patentable
advance, except, perhaps, as to the process, if the new product differs
190
from the old ‘merely in degree, and not in kind.’

Under the first step, no one had ever produced a comparable product to
the purified B-12, because it had such advantageous characteristics over
argued that ‘novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101,’ ‘[t]he question . . . of whether a
particular invention is novel is wholly apart from whether . . . the invention falls into a category of
statutory subject matter.’” (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189–90 (1981) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
185. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
186. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *113, *125–26.
187. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958);
Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 115; Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir.
1910).
188. Merck, 253 F.2d at 163.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 162.
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other vitamin B products. Under the second step, the purified B-12
192
differed in kind and not just in degree. The court stated that the new
product was more than a “mere advance in degree of purity,” and it
differed in kind, because “products of great therapeutic and commercial
worth have been developed. The new products [were] not the same as
the old, but new and useful compositions entitled to the protection of the
193
patent.” This language suggests that the purified B-12 differed in kind
from the old product because of its great therapeutic and commercial
worth.
The Seventh Circuit case, Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld
Co., also supports the commercial and therapeutic value distinction. The
court upheld a patent claiming purified aspirin as “a new article of
manufacture” because the purified aspirin was therapeutically
194
effective. Although the only difference between the two products was
purification, the court emphasized that the purified aspirin was
195
patentable because of its therapeutic use. Thus, therapeutic value is a
characteristic that makes a purified product a novel invention capable of
patent protection under the Seventh and Fourth Circuit’s reasoning.
Similarly, isolated and purified cDNA are therapeutically and
commercially significant. Like the naturally occurring adrenaline and
vitamin B, genes as they exist in nature cannot be used in a medically
meaningful way. Isolation and purification of the gene is a necessary step
in order to utilize the gene to diagnose mutations in people to determine
predisposed risk for genetic disease. In emphasizing the “markedly
different characteristics” test from Chakrabarty, the court in Association
for Molecular Pathology ignores this distinction made in prior cases
reviewed under a patentable subject matter analysis. The district court’s
analysis suggests that if Parke-Davis or Kuehmsted were decided under
Chakrabarty’s “markedly different characteristics” test under § 101, they
would be overturned because simply extracting a product of nature for
improved therapeutic use is not a sufficient change to satisfy the
patentable subject matter requirement. This application of the
“markedly different characteristics” test would invalidate all purified
products that are patentable, because of their increased therapeutic and
commercial properties. This was most likely not the outcome intended by
Chakrabarty when the Supreme Court stated, “in choosing such
expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified
by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 164.
Id.
179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1910).
Id.
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196

patent laws would be given wide scope.” In ignoring the therapeutic
value distinction made in prior case law, the district court misapplied the
“markedly different characteristics” test.
2. Isolated Genes and Natural DNA as Genetic Instructions Instead
of Chemical Compounds
The district court also incorrectly categorized DNA as information
and not as a chemical compound in order to conclude that isolated and
purified DNA is no different than native DNA and therefore not
patentable subject matter. The district court found that DNA’s unique
status as the “physical embodiment of information” remains the same for
197
naturally occurring DNA and for isolated and purified DNA. Genes
serve “as the physical embodiment of laws of nature—those that define
198
the construction of the human body.” An isolated and purified gene
199
still codes for proteins to define physical traits. Therefore, according to
the court, steps to isolate and purify DNA do not render the patented
gene markedly different, because both forms serve as instructions for the
200
coding of proteins.
Myriad tried to argue that DNA was similar to all biological
chemicals, in that all chemicals convey some sort of information in the
body, but the court distinguished DNA from other chemical compounds,
because chemical compounds embody information about their own
201
molecular structure for their own biological function. DNA, on the
202
other hand, directs the synthesis of other molecules. The district court
reasoned that because both isolated and purified DNA and native DNA
have the same coding properties and functions, their defining
203
characteristic remains the same. In addition, the court emphasized that
the physical coding sequences of cDNA are the same as those of spliced,
204
mature mRNA. Therefore, because the basis for isolated and purified
DNA’s utility stems from the same functional property contained in
native DNA, the court found that isolated and purified genes do not
205
markedly differ from native DNA.
The district court’s view of DNA is too narrow and directly
contradicts the Federal Circuit’s classification of DNA. In upholding
Amgen’s patent on an isolated and purified gene, the Federal Circuit
196. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
197. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *134–35 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
198. Id. at *134.
199. Id. at *143.
200. Id. at *134.
201. Id. at *131–32.
202. Id. at *133–34.
203. Id. at *138–39.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *134.
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stated, “[a] gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one.” By
classifying DNA as the embodiment of information and finding that
purified DNA does not differ from native DNA because of their shared
functional property of conveying genetic instruction, the district court
essentially identified what constituted “important” or “essential”
property of DNA, and decided that cDNA does not markedly differ from
native DNA. However, cDNA has important uses for which native DNA
is unsuitable. Those functions include diagnostic testing, using cDNA to
study the effect of a gene on a disease for therapeutic purposes, or
creating protein-based drugs on a large scale that were difficult to obtain
207
by purification. Genetic instruction is not the only property of DNA
and should not be the only factor to consider when applying the
“markedly different characteristics” test.
While the district court distinguished DNA from other chemical
compounds by its “unique qualities as a physical embodiment of
information,” the court does not clearly state how this difference renders
cDNA not patentable, while other purified chemical compounds are
208
patentable. If the issue is functionality of the compound itself, all
patents on purified products would be invalidated under the district
court’s reasoning. Like isolated DNA, purified adrenaline and vitamin B12 have the same chemical function as those existing in an impure form.
Their use in purified form necessarily relies on similar chemical
properties to the impure form. For example, adrenaline as it existed in
the powdered gland form still contained blood-pressure-raising
properties, which necessarily stemmed from adrenaline’s chemical
209
composition. The pure form simply allowed it to be safely and
210
effectively administered in humans. Vitamin B as it existed in cattle
211
liver still could treat pernicious anemia. Purification of the vitamin
212
simply yielded a more effective treatment. Similarly, isolated genes
could be the same product in native DNA as they are in cDNA.
However, isolating the gene and extracting it from human cells gives it
significant therapeutic value. That genes contain the same functional
properties as information carriers whether they are isolated or native
should not be the only consideration in determining whether isolated
genes contain markedly different characteristics from native genes. The
district court reasoning thus suggests that purification in general is simply

206. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
207. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30629, at *42, *140–42.
208. Id. at *135.
209. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 109 (S.D.N.Y 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d
Cir. 1912).
210. Id. at 115.
211. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 158 (4th Cir. 1958).
212. Id. at 164.
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not an inventive step yielding patentable subject matter. This narrow
view of purified products, including DNA, does not follow prior circuit
court precedent, and therefore the district court decision should be
overturned.

IV. Impact of Invalidating Gene Patents
Invalidating gene patents not only may fail to remedy many of the
harms suffered by patients as a result of Myriad’s monopoly on
diagnostic tests, but doing so may also lead to the invalidation of other
patents that were granted based on the purification doctrine. A major
concern is that thousands of patents will be invalidated and millions of
213
dollars lost if the Federal Circuit upholds the district court decision.
Depending on how the court frames the decision, these concerns may be
well-founded if the plaintiffs prevail. Even if a court were to render most
gene patents invalid, it is unlikely companies will lose the plethora of
intellectual property rights and billions of dollars they are afraid of losing
as a result of the pending litigation. Most gene patents, like Myriad’s, do
not just claim the isolated and purified DNA sequence; they also claim
diagnostic tests and methods for using or analyzing the sequence. If using
genes for specific diagnostic or therapeutic purposes could still be
patented, then companies could possibly still monopolize diagnostic tests
214
with other patents effectively blocking use of the genes anyway.
Nevertheless, the district court’s opinion is quite broad and could
potentially invalidate other types of patents. If upheld, the district court’s
decision might not even remedy the problems the plaintiffs experienced,
but it could have the unintended consequence of invalidating other types
of patents.
If the district court’s decision in Association for Molecular
Pathology is upheld, it could potentially invalidate an entire set of firstgeneration biotechnology patents. Although many of those patents are
expiring or expired, the patents that are still in effect will be invalidated
and future patents with similar bases will not be granted. Many of these
first-generation biotechnology patents consist of claims covering
naturally occurring, therapeutically useful molecules or an isolated DNA
sequence that codes for the production of naturally occurring,
therapeutically useful molecules. For example, Amgen’s patent, the
subject of litigation in 1991, was a patent claiming the sequence coding
for the production of erythropoietin (EPO), a hormone used as a
215
therapeutic agent for blood disorders. A similar example would be
Scripps’s patent covering purified Factor VIII:C, a naturally occurring

213. Koepsell, supra note 14, at 114; see Schwartz & Pollack, supra note 3.
214. See Koepsell, supra note 14, at 144.
215. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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protein that is essential for blood clotting. Applying Judge Sweet’s
reasoning from Association for Molecular Pathology, both these patents
and thousands of other similar patents would be invalid, because they
claim molecules in their isolated form that are really no different from
the naturally occurring molecules—except that isolating them allows
them to be used in a therapeutically significant way. Such a result could
detrimentally impact the biotechnology sector by removing incentives to
purify and commercialize therapeutically useful, naturally occurring
products.

V. Legislative Alternatives
Invalidating gene patents might be too narrow a reaction to remedy
the larger problems that harmed plaintiffs in Association for Molecular
pathology. A meta-analysis of all available empirical evidence relating to
the negative effects of gene patents indicates that the problems have less
to do with patenting and more to do with the nature of
217
commercialization in research and medicine in general. Even if gene
patents themselves were invalid, pharmaceutical companies, universities,
and clinical laboratories could still monopolize diagnostic tests through
other patents on platform technologies or methods of use. Given the
findings of the study, it seems unlikely that invalidating Myriad’s BRCA
patents would resolve the major concern of limiting scientific progress.
To invalidate gene patents in this case, the district court has incorrectly
applied the requirements for patentable subject matter and has expanded
the doctrine of standing by allowing third parties to bring a declaratory
judgment action without direct notice of enforcement of the patents-insuit. Rather than bend legal doctrine to meet a socially justifiable end, a
more plausible solution would be to urge Congress to create some sort of
statutory exemption for research or patient medical services that would
otherwise infringe gene patents.
A. Statutory Exemptions Suggested by SACGHS
In response to the current litigation, the Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) issued a revised
report assessing the effects of gene patenting and licensing practices on
218
patient and clinical access to genetic tests. The report draws on law and

216. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
217. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting
Controversies, 24 Nature Biotechnology 1091, 1093 (2006).
218. SACGHS Report, supra note 107, at ix. SACGHS advises the Secretary of Health and
Human Services on medical, ethical, legal and social issues raised by technological developments in
human genetics. Id. One of the specific issues that SACGHS was chartered to examine is “current
patent policy and licensing practices [and] their impact on access to genetic technologies.” Id.

McHugh_25 (S. Tosdal) (Do Not Delete)

216

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

11/23/2010 5:33 PM

[Vol. 62:185

policy, policy studies, and existing legal frameworks, to conclude that
obstacles in research development are the result of the decreasing
219
capacity of laws to mitigate the problems plaintiffs cite. Accordingly,
the Committee made six recommendations relating to fostering better
research and licensing practices, two of which suggest narrow statutory
exemptions for infringing gene patents. The first statutory change is an
“exemption from liability for anyone who infringes a patent on a gene
while making, using, ordering, offering for sale, or selling a genetic test
220
for patient care purposes.” The second is an exemption for the use of
221
patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research.
Under an exemption from infringement liability for patient care
purposes, researchers could create and sell an existing diagnostic test that
222
would otherwise be exclusively offered by the patent holder. This
exemption proposes to improve the availability and quality of genetic
223
tests by restoring basic free market conditions for genetic tests. There
are several diseases where unencumbered use of a gene patent has
allowed for greater, more cost-efficient access to genetic tests for
patients. For example, patents related to hereditary nonpolyposis
colorectal cancer have not been enforced, allowing at least fifteen
224
different laboratories to develop genetic testing. Similar results have
occurred with cystic fibrosis and Huntington’s disease, because
225
exclusivity has not been enforced with those diseases. Rather than
eliminate gene patents altogether, this exemption addresses patient
access concerns by introducing competition to lower costs and increase
the likelihood that patients will find a provider that accepts their
226
Multiple providers would also lead to availability of
insurance.
confirmatory testing, which would improve the quality of testing patients
227
receive.
However, this exemption might be too narrow. The exemption still
allows for patents claiming methods of genetic analysis and platform
technologies that could block the use of existing diagnostic tests. If other
labs created and sold Myriad’s breast cancer diagnostic test, they may be
exempt from infringement liability for infringing the gene patent, but
they would still infringe any valid method patents and any potential
platform technology patents. Thus, the exemption could have little to no
practical effect on increasing patient access to genetic tests.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The second exemption aims to allow researchers to develop new
genetic tests and therapeutics without being liable for infringement. This
recommendation seeks to promote the progress of science and the useful
228
arts. Using patented genes for research purposes often does not satisfy
the experimental research exemption, because there is usually, if not
always, a commercial interest in such research and not merely “idle
229
curiosity.” Rather than focus on the availability of current genetic tests,
this exemption would allow researchers to use patent-protected genes to
develop new prognosis and risk assessment methods that would provide
230
patients with more effective testing and diagnostic services.
While more plausible than the first, this exemption could also be
circumvented by a patent claiming an essential method for analyzing the
gene. For example, Myriad could still exclude other laboratories from
developing alternative diagnostic tests if there was no workaround to
analyzing a BRCA gene for mutations to determine genetic risk for
breast cancer. If companies can patent a broad method of analyzing the
gene that is essential to developing any diagnostic test, this exception
could also have no practical effect.
B. Create an Exception Similar to Existing Legislation
If an exception to gene patents alone is too narrow to allow
researchers to feasibly practice diagnostic testing without infringing
related patents, a broader exception for a more specific and limited
purpose could be more appropriate. An exception similar to the current
medical and surgical procedure exception under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) could
231
be more effective. Enacted in 1996 in response to litigation surrounding
the infringement of “a sutureless method of closing eye incisions
232
following cataract surgery,” the exception states:
(c)(1)With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a
medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a)
or (b) of this title, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of
this title shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a
related health care entity with respect to such medical activity. . . .
....
(A) [T]he term “medical activity” means the performance of a
medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include . . . the
233
practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.

228. Id. at 95.
229. Id. at 59.
230. Id. at 89.
231. Michele Westhoff, Gene Patents: Ethical Dilemmas and Possible Solutions, 20 Health L. 1, 9–
10 (2008).
232. Id. at 9.
233. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006).
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Section 287(c) was enacted “[b]ecause the ‘medical community had a
longstanding tradition of freely sharing information about advancements
in healthcare, and [because] the practice of building upon trial and error
234
promoted rather than stifled medical and surgical methods.’” Although
§ 287(c) specifically excludes biotechnology patents, concerns about how
detrimental gene patents could be for patients were not realized and
brought to the public’s attention until Association for Molecular
Pathology. Concerns about gene patents limiting patient access to
diagnostic tests are also similar to those that initiated the creation of an
exception for medical and surgical procedures. Rather than create an
exception for gene patents specifically, an amendment could be written
similarly to § 287(c), where any infringement by a medical practitioner
235
for purposes of genetic diagnosis would be exempt from liability. This
type of legislation is a compromise between industry, research, and
clinical medicine. It would allow companies to enforce their patents
against researchers and scientists who would attempt to commercialize
any tests using patented genes or methods, while granting more efficient,
236
lower-cost patient access to diagnostic tests.
C. Model After Other Countries’ Laws
Congress could enact legislation similar to that of other countries
either by excluding diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical methods from
patentability, or by denying patentability to an invention on moral
grounds. Both of these exceptions are listed as possible options for
countries to adopt under the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreement, which outlines specific minimum standards for its
member countries for the harmonization of international intellectual
237
property laws. It seems unlikely that Congress would implement
legislation excluding DNA or diagnostic methods from patentability on
moral grounds, because in the U.S., there is generally no accepted
238
exclusion from patentability based on morality. However, Congress
could implement legislation similar to that of other countries that allow
for the exclusion of diagnostic methods from patentability. For example,
the U.K. and Germany exclude from patentability methods for treating
234. Westhoff, supra note 231, at 9–10 (quoting Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability
Act and Inventor Protection Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 24 (1995) (statement of Rep. Greg Ganske)).
235. See id. at 10.
236. Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) to
Allow Health Care Providers to Examine their Patients’ DNA, 26 S. Ill. U. L.J. 471, 503–04 (2002).
237. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197, 1197–98 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
238. Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623, 1651 (2001).
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humans or animals by surgery or therapy, as well as diagnostic
239
methods. However, this restriction does not apply to research tools and
would therefore, not apply to the patented gene sequences themselves.
On the other hand, other provisions in TRIPS might allow for a specific
exclusion of gene sequences from patentability for diagnostic purposes.
Article 30 of TRIPS allows for limited exceptions that do not
240
unreasonably prejudice the interests of the patent holder. Under this
exemption, France and Belgium permit the grant of a compulsory license
241
over patents claiming diagnostic methods. Thus, it is possible that
Congress could allow for a very narrow exclusion, or possibly a
compulsory license, and still comply with international intellectual
property agreements. Congress could model similar exceptions or grants
of compulsory licenses after other countries that have already
implemented such limitations.

Conclusion
Gene patenting has incited legal and ethical debate since its
inception, but the debate has been exacerbated by Myriad’s limited
licensing practices and high costs for diagnostic tests involving the BRCA
1/2 genes. Although the plaintiffs’ harms are serious, the district court
should not have erroneously granted standing to the plaintiffs and
misapplied the “markedly different characteristics” test to address the
harms resulting from Myriad’s monopolistic exercise of its BRCA patent
rights. As a practical matter, granting standing to third-party consumers
to sue for harms resulting from the commercialization of medical
technologies would also invite many more parties to sue patent holders
and the USPTO for exercising their patent rights. Moreover, in light of
the fact that invalidating gene patents might not solve many of the
patients’ harms, a legislative exception seems to be a more effective and
practical solution. Rather than invalidating gene patents under the
common law, Congress should adopt a legislative limitation or
compulsory license to remedy the harms patenting human genes can
cause.

239. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBl. I at 1, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 31,
2009, BGBl. I at 2521, §§ 1a, 5 (Ger.); Patents Act, (1977) § 4A, 19(2A) Hals. Stat. (4th ed.) 380
(U.K.).
240. See TRIPS, supra note 237, at 209.
241. Loi sur les brevets d’invention [Patents Act] of Mar. 28, 1984, Moniteur Belge [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium] as amended on Apr. 28, 2005, http:/www.staatsblad.be; Loi 2004-800
du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique (1), [Law 2004-800 of Aug. 4, 2004 on Relating to Bioethics],
182 Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official gazette of France], Aug. 6,
2004, p. 14040.
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